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Using a panel data set of European countries, this paper investigates the impact of
crime on international tourism. Violent crimes are negatively associated with incom-
ing international tourists and international tourism revenue indicating that tourists
consider the risk of victimization when choosing locations to visit. This impact is
smaller in magnitude in Southern European countries which are generally more attrac-
tive tourist destinations suggesting that victimization risk and attractiveness of the
destination may be substitutable traits.
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11 Introduction
Although the impact of economic activity on crime has been investigated extensively (Cor-
man and Mocan 2000, Levitt 1998, Block and Heineke 1975), there are only a handful of
studies that analyzed the inuence of crime on economic activity. For example, Cullen and
Levitt (1999) report that individuals move away from areas with high crime rates. Peri
(2004) argues that organized crime is associated with low economic development.
There are a few studies that investigate whether tourism activity (as a part of overall
economic activity) is inuenced by crime using data obtained from small geographic regions.
For example, Levantis and Gani (2000) nd that increased crime is associated with less
tourism activity using time-series data from South Pacic and the Caribbeans. McPheters
and Stronge (1974) report that number of tourists is positively correlated with crime in
Miami. However, these cross-sectional or time-series analyzes have limitations, such as the
inability to control for unobservable area characteristics.
Using a panel data set of European countries covering years 1995 to 2003, this paper
investigates the impact of crime on international tourism activity and the dierential re-
sponsiveness of tourism by region.
2 Model
The estimated equation is depicted below:
Tc;t =  + Crimec;t 1 + Sc;t + c + t + "c;t;
where Tc;t stands for international tourists per 10 residents, visiting country c in year t or
real international tourism revenue per 10 residents1. Both variables are obtained from World
Development Indicators.
1The mean of tourists per 10 residents is 7.2 and that of the tourism revenue per 10 residents is $4942.56Crimec;t 1 denotes crimes per 100,000 residents. Following Corman and Mocan (2000)
and Levitt (1998), it is lagged by one year to avoid potential reverse causality. Both violent
crimes (homicides, assaults, rapes, robberies) and property crimes (thefts and burglaries)
are analyzed. Crime data are obtained from European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal
Justice.
The vector Sc;t controls for the unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, exchange rate,
urbanization rate, number of hospital beds per 1,000 people, prevalence of tuberculosis,
teenage pregnancy rate and the ratio of old people to young people in the country. Time in-
variant factors that may inuence international tourism activity such as a country's historical
sites, coastline's length and average temperature, are captured by country xed eects(c).
Regressions also include time dummies represented by t.
3 Results
Table 1 presents the results from the specication where international tourists per 10 res-
idents is the dependent variable. Homicide, assault and aggregate violent crime have a
negative impact on tourist arrivals, while aggregate property crime, theft and burglary do
not have a signicant inuence. Although not statistically signicant, other control vari-
ables have expected signs. Elasticity estimates of international tourists per 10 residents
with respect to aggregate violent crime, homicide and assault rates are  0:07,  0:26 and
 0:07, respectively. Similar results, which are displayed in Table 2, are obtained from the
specication where international tourism revenue per 10 residents is the dependent variable.
Elasticities of international tourism revenue per 10 residents with respect to aggregate violent
crime, homicide and assault rates are  0:08,  0:14 and  0:07, respectively.
Crime's impact on international tourism may dier between countries. Similar to the
trade-o between risk and return (Fama and MacBeth 1973), if international tourists are
highly attracted to a country's touristic prospects, the crime rate in that country may not
2be a signicant deterrent for international tourists. In other words, the attractiveness of a
country may partly compensate for the probability of victimization.
According to the World Tourism Organization2, 50% of all international tourists visit a
foreign country for leisure and recreation. According to this criterion, Southern Europe is
a more attractive tourist destination compared to Northern Europe, since Southern Euro-
pean countries have longer coastlines available for sea tourism, more historical artifacts and
mountainous terrain that oer opportunities for skiing.
To investigate whether crime impacts tourism dierently in Southern versus Northern
Europe, I estimate the model using two sub-samples. Countries whose average latitude is
above (below) 50 North are included in the Northern (Southern) sample3. In the interest of
space, only the coecients of the violent crimes are reported in Table 3. Aggregate violent
crime, homicide and assault are negatively associated with international tourists in Northern
sample, but not in the Southern sample. Similar ndings are displayed in Panel 2 of Table
3 which presents the estimates of violent crimes' impacts on international tourism revenue.
More rapes, assaults and aggregate violent crimes are associated with less tourism revenue4.
I also estimate models where the interaction of a country's average latitude with its
crime rate is included as an independent variable. The main eect of the latitude cannot
be included jointly with the interaction term as the models contain country xed eects.
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the closer to the north pole a country is, the
larger the impact of violent crimes becomes. A 1% increase in the aggregate violent crime
rate decreases the number of international tourists per 10 residents by (0:00135 Latitude)
percent. For Iceland (at 65 North), the elasticity of tourists per 10 residents with respect
2http://www.unwto.org/facts/menu.html
3Some of the countries that are included in the South sample are Bulgaria, France, Greece, Italy, Spain
and Switzerland. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Iceland are among those countries which are
in the North sample.
4Similar results are obtained when 47.2 North (the median latitude) or 45 North is used to separate
Northern European countries from Southern European countries.
3to aggregate violent crime rate is -0.088. The same elasticity for Cyprus (at 35 North) is
-0.047. As shown in the second panel of Table 4, similar results are obtained for international
tourism revenue. These ndings support the hypothesis that the impact of violent crimes on
international tourism activity in Northern Europe is stronger than it is in Southern Europe
which has more touristic attractions. These impacts are also economically signicant. For
example, for an average country with a population of 25 million, a 10% increase in aggregate
violent crime rate leads to about $100 million (in 2000 dollars) decline in international
tourism revenue. Using Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000)'s locally-owned entertainment venue
multiplier of 1.5 as a lower bound, the economic impact of such an increase in violent crime
rate is at least $150 million.
4 Conclusion
Using a panel data set of European countries, this paper investigates the impact of crime
on international tourism activity. Violent crimes are negatively associated with incoming
international tourists and international tourism revenue. The impact of violent crimes is
stronger in Northern European countries where touristic attractions are fewer than Southern
European countries. This nding may be an evidence for the hypothesis that the risk of
victimization borne by the tourists is (partly) compensated by the touristic attractiveness
of the country. The results suggest that tourists evaluate the risk of victimization when
choosing a destination, and that crime has a negative impact on economic activity.
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